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I can think of no greater compliment than to have been asked to deliver 
this first Bradford Morse Lecture. I have long known and admired Brad 
Morse as mentor, leader, and friend. His initiative in developing and 
inspiring a global network of confidants and co-workers has made a 
contribution to international cooperation which is both unique and 
enduring. 
Nowhere has that influence been more important than in Africa, 
and no one from outside of Africa enjoys the universal esteem, confidence, 
and affection that the Africans have for Brad Morse. So, when U.N. 
Secretary Perez de Cuellar called on Brad Morse to lead the United Nations 
response to the great African famine crisis in 1984, he chose than man who, 
above all others, had the ability to inspire the necessary confidence of 
Africans and of the international community to mobilize the 
unprecedented measures needed to deal with that emergency. 
It was one of the greatest privileges of my own life to be able to 
share that experience with him as his lieutenant. During that period, and 
since, Bradford Morse has more than justified the faith that Africans and 
the international community showed in him at that time. Because of it, 
literally millions of Africans survived that devastating experience and were 
given the opportunity to rebuild their shattered lives. 
This episode is but one of the many examples of the unique 
combination of vitality, energy, vision, and leadership which Brad Morse 
has brought to the international community. He has contributed to the 
resolution of some of its most difficult problems while building the 
capacity to face the future with greater hope and promise, and enriching 
the lives of all he has touched along the way. The establishment of this 
lectureship at the university which has played such an important role in his 
distinguished career, on the occasion of its 150th anniversary, is a fitting 
tribute to Bradford Morse. It will provide a vehicle for ensuring the 
continued pursuit of his example and his vision by those of us who follow 
him. 
2 
I am especially pleased that you have asked me to address the 
subject of Africa and its future. I can think of no more appropriate or 
more important subject for this first Bradford Morse Lecture. 
First, I believe it is essential that the current situation in Africa be 
seen in the perspective of Africa's history during the last century. It was 
only a little over a century ago in 1885 when European leaders gathered at 
the Congress of Berlin to divide Africa among themselves. Not a single 
African was present, nor was any real account taken of traditional ethnic 
or natural boundaries in establishing the borders that still today largely 
define the political geography of Africa. It is hard to grasp the full scope 
and scale of the profound changes that have effected the life and destiny 
of Africa since 1885. But an understanding of these changes is essential to 
an appreciation of Africa's dilemma and its prospects at this point in 
history. 
The past century saw the subjugation of most of Africa by 
European powers, the imposition of colonial regimes which wrenched 
Africans away from their traditions and ways of life and made them 
servants of alien cultures and economic interests. Following World War II, 
the colonial regimes crumbled before a surging wave of African 
nationalism encouraged and supported by a liberal international 
environment and the weakened condition of the European colonial powers 
as a result of the war. Nevertheless, many of the structures, the attitudes, 
and the dependencies developed during the colonial period remained. 
The period which followed the independence of the new African 
nations was one of rapid and radical change. The political energies which 
had been mobilized during the struggle for independence were channeled 
into the task of nation-building. Economic and social development became 
the prime objective. It was an exciting time, a hopeful time. Africa had 
entered a new era of promise in which political freedom was to produce a 
new period of economic and social progress. 
At the same time, Africa emerged as a refreshing and dynamic new 
factor on the world stage. The new voices of free Africa were welcomed 
and respected in the councils of the world community. The newly 
independent nations of Africa rapidly became active and influential 
members of the United Nations and its agencies, as well as of other 
multilateral organizations. Africa created its own regional organizations, 
notably the Organization for African Unity, while making the U.N. 
Economic Commission for Africa one of the most influential of the 
regional organizations of the United Nations. 
Indeed, Africa developed very special ties with the United Nations. 
These special ties had their roots in the key role the U.N. played in 
effecting the transition to independence on the part of so many of the new 
African nations. Following independence, the U.N. and its agencies became 
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a prime source of support and assistance for these countries in helping 
them to establish the national and regional institutions and capabilities 
required to achieve their economic and social development goals. The 
principal instrumentality of this cooperation was the United Nations 
Development Program and the UNDP resident representative became the 
focal point for orchestrating this development partnership that contributed 
so much to the progress of the African nations during the 1960s and early 
1970s. This unique development partnership flourished especially during the 
period of Brad Morse's leadership as administrator of UNDP. 
The progress made was impressive by any standard. Growth of GNP 
in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa averaged 3.7 percent per annum 
from 1965 through 1973 on a per capita basis. 
This progress was all the more remarkable given the handicaps 
which history and nature had imposed on the African nations. They 
emerged from independence with few national institutions and but small 
cadres of people educated, trained, and experienced in the fields essential to 
the management of their economies. The structure of their economies was 
designed to serve the interests of the colonial power to which they were 
subject. They were subordinate economies and their heavy dependence on 
their former colonial masters could not be rapidly and easily shed by the 
achievement of political independence. It soon became apparent that 
economic independence would be much more difficult to attain. 
The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the export 
earnings of African countries came principally from the sale of a few 
primary products -- cocoa, palm oil, cotton, sisal, rubber, coffee, tobacco 
and minerals. Producing these primary commodities for export markets 
dictated internal economic priorities, the deployment of investment and 
development of infrastructure. Areas not directly geared to the export-
oriented economies were neglected. 
Nature, too, has imposed special burdens on Africa. Weather 
patterns are highly variable and the extremes are destructive. In much of 
Africa, rainfall patterns vary between 30 to 49 percent from year to year, 
much greater than in other regions. Thus, floods often follow droughts and 
compound their destructive impacts. Some 30 percent of the entire 
continent is either desert or near-desert, and this area is growing. Only 19 
percent of African soils have no serious fertility limitations, and most 
arable soils are highly susceptible to erosion. Tsetse fly infestation renders 
an area larger than the continental Unite States largely unusable. The 
African farmer faces a constant battle against pests of other sorts, 
including periodic plagues of locusts, army worms, and other insects. 
Africa's handicaps have been further compounded by the distorting 
influences of the technological revolution. Advances in medical science 
have dramatically reduced death rates. Infant mortality rates in African 
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countries have been reduced by one-third since independence, yet they 
remain at unacceptably high levels. Life expectancy has increased by more 
than ten years. Fertility rates have also risen to the point where they are 
now more than twice the world average. The commitment to fertility is 
deeply rooted in African culture, religion, and values; these will change but 
slowly. 
The net rise to unprecedented rates of population increase now 
averages 3 percent per annum. This means that in the next decade. Africa's 
population will grow from its present level of some 560 million to almost 
800 million and, if current trends continue, will triple by the year 2025. Yet, 
Africa has had but meager access thus far to the technologies, capital, and 
expertise required to increase production to match this population growth, 
let alone to effect the kind of per capita increase in economic growth 
required to lift it out of the quagmire of poverty which engulfs the 
majority of its people. 
AIDS has emerged as the latest threat to Africa, afflicting an 
alarming number of Africans in the prime of their lives. A tragedy with 
devastating human and economic implications is unfolding, the dimensions 
and consequences of which we are only beginning to perceive. But from 
what we already know, it is clear that AIDS is imposing a terrible new 
burden on Africa. 
The task of nation-building and economic and social development in 
Africa has also been severely constrained by the artificial divisions 
imposed on Africa at the Congress of Berlin. These provided the seeds of 
many of the conflicts within and between African nations which have 
drained away precious human and economic resources as well as political 
energies. In southern Africa, these conflicts have been greatly exacerbated 
by the destabilizing practices of South Africa in attempting to perpetuate 
its apartheid regime, which is an affront to the dignity of all Africans, as 
well as to the conscience of the world community. The recent agreement 
under which Namibia's long-overdue independence will be realized and 
South African and Cuban troops withdrawn from Angola, promises to 
reduce if not eliminate the conflict in that important part of southern 
Africa. But it does nothing to resolve the fundamental problem of 
apartheid in South Africa itself, which is a continuing source of conflict 
with its neighbors. 
The great African famine brought the problems of Africa 
dramatically to the attention of the world community. The world responded 
rapidly and generously by joining hands with Africans to stem the tide 
which threatened to become one of the greatest human tragedies of all 
times. Some 200 million people in twenty countries of sub-Saharan Africa 
were acutely affected by the famine, more than 30 million of them to the 
point where their survival was in doubt. The vast majority of these people 
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survived, thanks to the heroic efforts of the African people, reinforced by a 
mammoth international relief effort mounted under the leadership of the 
United Nations through its Office for Emergency Operations in Africa, 
directed by Bradford Morse. It is one of the greatest humanitarian success 
stories of all time, equivalent in human terms to averting a major world 
war. 
But Africa's problems did not begin with famine; nor did they end 
when the images of starving people and airlifts of relief supplies receded 
from our television screens. The famine was preceded by some seventeen 
years of below average rainfall, the longest drought on record. Its impacts 
were compounded, and some believe the drought itself was exacerbated, by 
widespread destruction of forests and vegetative cover. This, in turn, is the 
product of expanded cropping and livestock grazing, and by the rapidly 
increasing demand for fuel wood, which supplies some 80 percent of the 
energy needs of sub-Saharan Africa. It has been estimated that in parts of 
the Sahelian region where crops and livestock would sustain a population 
of seven people per square kilometer, the fuel wood supply is only 
sufficient for one person. Yet only one tree is being planted for every ten 
harvested in Africa. 
Ecological breakdown is both a product of and a contributor to 
Africa's growing economic problems. It is a vicious circle. Growing human 
and animal populations place increased pressures on the land accelerating 
the destruction of trees and vegetative cover and the loss of soil and 
nutrients, reducing the productive capacity of the land. Drought accelerated 
these processes. As a result, per capita production of food has been falling 
in Africa since 1970 despite large-scale expansion of the amount of land 
under cultivation. Africa has been transformed from a food exporter in the 
early 1960s to a major importer. Between 1960 and 1980 the number of 
malnourished people in Africa grew by 50 percent and now amounts to 
nearly half of the total population. 
Africa's capacity to buy the food it needs has also been drastically 
reduced by the deterioration of its economy. Between 1961 and 1980, 
earnings from tea, coffee, cotton, tobacco, and natural rubber crops 
declined sharply, despite increased production. In the past decade, most sub-
Saharan African countries have experienced a reduction in overall growth 
rates, rising inflation and mounting current account deficits, and an 
enormous increase in debt. From 1974 to 1984, per capita GDP declined by 
nearly one percent per year and per capita income has declined since 1980 
at an average rate of about 4 percent per annum to a level that is now 
some 15 to 25 percent less than fifteen years ago. In the same period, 
inflation grew from an annual rate of 10 percent to more than 20 percent, 
and the current account deficit from $4 billion to $14 billion. Although 
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there has been some recovery in the growth of GDP during the past four 
years, GDP fell again in 1987. 
The economies of the sub-Saharan African countries have been 
severely affected by conditions in the international economy. In the early 
1970s the majority of countries which are oil importers had to absorb the 
sharp increase in oil prices and the related increases in the cost of their 
imports of manufactured goods. Most of them borrowed heavily during this 
period when interest rates have been at historically high levels. The 
external debt of sub-Saharan African countries rose from $5.3 billion in 
1970 to $82.4 billion in 1986. Debt service obligations rose from $1.2 billion in 
1973 to $8.9 billion in 1987. Debt service payments now account for some 
two-thirds of export earnings in most African countries. In low-income 
countries, total debt is now more than 100 percent of GNP and five times 
the value of annual export earnings. Despite the fact that African countries 
account for only some 10 percent of overall developing country debt, the 
debt levels of some low-income African countries are particularly 
burdensome. This has been recognized recently by creditor nations which 
have extended special debt relief measure to African countries. But the 
fundamental problem remains. 
Recent increases in Official Development Assistance have not 
stemmed the outflow of capital from sub-Saharan Africa. The 
hemorrhaging has been reduced but not stopped. The cost of servicing 
private debt, low levels of private lending and investment, capital flight and 
payments to IMF, amounting to some $500 million a year in 1986 and 1987, 
more than offset increases in ODA. 
The trade deficits of the low-income countries of Africa have also 
grown as a result of lower prices and demand for their own products, 
combined with higher prices for their imports of petroleum and 
manufactured goods. By 1983, Africa had lost half its market share of world 
exports, However, averages for the region are distorted by the fact that the 
five oil-exporting countries in Africa, which account for almost 60 percent 
of its GDP and half its exports, were severely affected by the decline in oil 
prices in the 1980s, which produced corresponding benefits for the other 40 
countries of the region which are oil importers. As pointed out in a recent 
World Bank report, the decline in the prices of non-oil commodities 
exported by sub-Saharan African countries has only been half as much 
since 1975 as that for all primary commodity exports. Nearly all the decline 
in export earnings and terms of trade for the region since 1980 can be 
attributable to declining oil prices, and if these are excluded, the nominal 
export earnings for 1987 would have been higher than the average for the 
1978-1983 period. 
Military expenditures by African governments rose from $8.5 billion 
in 1970 to $14 billion in 1982 and have, no doubt, grown further since then, 
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imposing an oppressive burden on the economy of a number of these 
countries. The indirect costs of Africa's internal conflicts may be even 
more burdensome. Those generated by the hostile and aggressive pressures 
exerted by South Africa on its neighbors continue despite the recent 
agreement in respect of Namibia and Angola. The still unresolved conflicts 
in other parts of southern Sudan, in the Tigreyan and Eritrean regions of 
Ethiopia, impose tremendous strains on the political management and 
economic energies of these countries, and severely disrupt and undermine 
their internal development. 
Even countries which have not experienced such large-scale and 
prolonged conflict have had their energies sapped and their development 
impeded by political instability. The fifty-one independent African nations 
have experienced at least sixty coups, and some half of them today have 
military rulers. Repressive regimes and lack of democratic participation in 
government in some countries exact a heavy price, both in terms of human 
rights and constraints on development. 
One of the consequences of Africa's internal conflicts has been the 
swelling refugee population. Some 4 million of the world's 10 million 
refugees are in Africa, most of them in countries which have been 
experiencing severe economic problems. The Sudan alone accommodated 
more than 1 million refugees during the recent famine emergency, despite 
the hardships which the drought had inflicted on its own people. 
No analysis of Africa's crisis can begin to convey the immeasurable 
human costs it has imposed on Africa's people -- the tragedy of those who 
lost the desperate struggle for survival in the recent famine and the untold 
sufferings of those for .whom the struggle continues. About 70 percent of 
the total African population, and close to 90 percent in some of the poorest 
countries, is either destitute or below the poverty line. The crisis has had a 
particularly severe impact on African women and children. It has 
devastated the nomadic peoples, destroying their traditional ways of life, 
and inflicting on them widespread suffering and an uncertain future. 
One-half of Africa's labor force is either unemployed or under-
employed. Real wages for those who were employed fell by about 25 
percent between 1980 and 1986. Close to 60 percent of the urban population 
lives in slums and/or squatter developments; only one in four has access to 
safe drinking water; child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa is double the 
average of developing countries as a whole. As UNICEF points out, there 
has been a downward trend in the nutritional status of women, and in the 
support African governments have been able to provided for basic health 
and social services as well as education. Each year this "silent emergency" 
claims the lives of nearly 4 million African children. Overall, the average 
person in twenty-five sub-Saharan African countries is poorer and hungrier 
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today than in 1970, and the resource base on which they depend has 
diminished. 
In many respects, there are in reality "two Africas" -- the rural 
areas in which the majority continues to live in a subsistence economy 
based largely on traditional values and patterns of life, and the urban areas 
in which the privileged minority lives in the growing modern economy 
which acts as a magnet to the rural poor. The result is a massive influx of 
people to the urban areas which has produced explosive rates of 
urbanization. Urban growth has been increasing by more than double the 
population growth. In 1980, some 20 percent of Africans live in cities or 
towns of more than 20,000 inhabitants; by the year 2000, the urban 
population will be more than 30 percent. Most of the newcomers live in 
marginal settlements at the edge of cities and towns without access to basic 
water, sanitation, and other services. The cities of Africa are in danger of 
becoming centers of frustration, tension and conflict which threaten the 
stability of their countries. 
It has to be said that many African countries were slow to come to 
grips with these harsh economic realities. In 1982, they formulated the 
Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa to the year 
2000, which articulated a series of goals and measures designed to arrest the 
deterioration of the African economies and move them towards sustained 
economic and social growth and self-reliance. But the policy changes 
required to implement the Lagos Plan of Action were realized more in lip-
service than in reality until the continent-wide drought of 1984 to 1986, 
combined with the effects of the world recession, provided a compelling 
impetus to change. 
This was clearly demonstrated in the agreement reached between 
the African countries and the international donor community at the 
historical special session of the United Nations General Assembly of 
Africa in 1986 on a United Nations Program of Action for Economic 
Recovery and Development 1986-90. In this session, the African nations 
agreed to make the kinds of basic changes in policies and priorities which 
the donor community had long been urging. Since then, they have made 
these changes to an impressive degree. Stabilization and adjustment 
programs of the IMF and The World Bank are now in force or under 
negotiation in some thirty African countries, which have demonstrated an 
impressive commitment to implementing them despite the onerous political 
and human costs they have imposed. 
Net disbursements of Official Development Assistance to those 
countries that have undertaken policy and structural reforms increased by 
almost 20 percent per year during the period 1985-1987. But, as already 
noted, increases in ODA have not been sufficient to stem the overall 
capital outflow. This situation is untenable and must be reversed if the 
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minimum needs for recovery of sub-Saharan Africa and sustained long-
term development are to be met. 
Fortunately, the return of the rains and exceptionally good weather 
conditions during the past couple of years, combined with higher prices of 
metals and some other commodities, have helped to make up for shortfalls 
in external resource flows. Improved agricultural performance lifted GDP 
growth rates in 1988, although not enough to produce per capita income 
growth which has continued to fall since 1980. The U.N. Economic 
Commission for Africa, in its recent review of the performance of the 
African economies in 1988 and outlook for 1989, raises the prospect of an 
increase in per capita income in 1989 based on a continuation of good 
weather conditions and high metal prices. It also points out that the 
external sector of the African economies has continued to stagnate with 
the total; value of exports falling by some 2 percent in 1988. It cites the 
dismal situation in respect of investment, which has fallen in many 
countries to an insignificant proportion of GDP. The lack of additions to 
capital stock has ominous implications for future development. It is a trend 
that must be reversed. This reversal can only come about through a 
combination of a substantial reduction in debt service charges increased 
development assistance, reductions in military expenditures, and a reversal 
of the flight of capital. 
In the meantime, there is also some good news from Africa. The 
World Bank reported that in 1988 economic growth in the ten countries 
belonging to the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC) outstripped population growth for the first time in fifteen years. 
While favorable weather contributed to this, so did economic reforms. 
Governments paid their farmers more and adopted more realistic exchange 
rates. Farmers responded by producing up to 30 percent more. Ghana's 
success in making the transition from a devastated economy to an 
impressive resumption of growth, also demonstrated what can be done by 
improved economic management and structural reform. The performance 
of the other African countries which have made similar changes is also 
producing signs of renewed economic growth. 
But the costs of structural adjustment are high in human and social 
terms. They continue to fall more heavily on the rural poor than on the 
urban populations and are particularly devastating to children. Reductions 
in health, social and nutritional services, and education disproportionately 
disadvantage the young. Yet it is on the young people of Africa that its 
future, in the final analysis, depends. 
Recent improvements in the economic performance of many 
African countries provide an encouraging demonstration that they can 
reverse the debilitating and destructive downtrends of the past fifteen years 
and restore the sustained economic growth which is indispensable to their 
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future. As I have already noted, they are burdened with some severe 
handicaps. But there are also important assets on which they can build. 
Notwithstanding the rapid rate of population growth, Africa still 
has a higher ratio of arable land per capita than any other major 
developing region. Although much of the continent is arid and subject to 
recurrent cycles of drought, it also has extensive potential groundwater 
resources. Despite the decline in food production per capita, African 
farmers over the past thirty years have demonstrated the capacity to 
increase their productivity in arid areas at more than double the rate 
achieved by the Australian farmer in vastly more hospitable conditions. In 
terms of calories produced per hour of labor, the African peasant farmer is 
more efficient than the Asian rice farmer. 
As a farmer myself, I have developed a tremendous respect for the 
African peasant farmer. Since some 80 percent of the farming is done by 
women, it is appropriate to refer to the farmer as "she." She is the strong 
link in the food production chain. Peasant farmers in Zimbabwe, for 
example, who have recently been given the kind of support in terms of 
credit, seeds, tools, inputs, and assured markets for their products previously 
only available to white farmers, have responded by producing record-
breaking crops. Even with the great handicaps under which peasant 
farmers have normally had to operate, they account for virtually all local 
food production and most export crops. 
The peasant farmer is Africa's principal economic resource. Support 
for the peasant farmer offers the best possible prospect for healthy and 
sustained economic growth in Africa. A recent study of the food potential 
of Africa indicated that even with current subsistence farming methods, 
Africa could feed some three times its 1975 level population; with 
intermediate levels of inputs, it could feed some twelve times; and with a 
high level of inputs, thirty-four times its 1975 population. While this 
underscores the future potential of Africa, it should not engender 
complacency. The same report points out the very real difficulties of 
realizing these potentials and projects that by the year 2000, twenty-nine 
African countries with a total population of 466 million will be capable of 
feeding only 210 million people from their own lands at current low levels 
of agricultural inputs. 
Traditional African culture and value systems provide a sound basis 
for African development, since African social organization, based on the 
extended family, provides the kind of mutual support, sharing, and 
cooperation that gives its members a degree of security governments are 
unable to provide. The tradition of subsistence agriculture has give African 
farmers a deep knowledge of nature and an ability to cope with its 
exigencies that serves them well in times of emergency. The glaring 
inequities in land ownership, usurious lending, and exploitative marketing 
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practices, so prevalent in Latin America and in Asia, are much less evident 
in Africa. Africa has also important energy resources, including the world's 
largest under-developed hydro-electric power potential, as well as large 
petroleum resources. Its mineral resources are both substantial and still 
largely unexplored and undeveloped. 
So when we point to the problems and handicaps of Africa, it is 
important to point out that these are balanced by some very significant 
potentials. 
It should also be borne in mind that Africa has received, on a per 
capita basis. more foreign aid than any other region of the developing 
world. Between 1970 and 1982, official development assistance increased in 
real terms by 5 percent per year, and by the early 1980s amounted to an 
average of about $20 per person, as compared to $7 per person in Latin 
America and $5 per person in Asia. By 1986, fifteen countries depended on 
aid for at least 90 percent of their external finance. Net financial flows to 
sub-Saharan Africa increased to $13.1 billion in 1987 from the low levels of 
1984 and 1985, but are still well below the $14.6 billion annual average in the 
period 1980-1985. Aid to agriculture has dropped at the very time when it 
needs most to be increased. As already noted, donors are now shifting a 
higher proportion of their assistance to those countries which are 
implementing policy reforms and structural adjustments. 
Inadequacy in the institutional and management capacities of the 
African countries have contributed to a low rate of effectiveness in the use 
of foreign aid. In 1985, the World Bank estimated that the failure rate of 
the projects it funded in Africa was the highest in any region, with 
performance in agriculture the worst of any sector. 
On the whole, foreign assistance has helped the development of the 
African nations. But it also must be said that it has tended to reinforce and 
even encourage some of the imbalances which continue to plague African 
development, particularly those which have favored urban areas over 
agriculture and rural development. Paradoxically, the economic devastation 
created by the drought, by the decline in investment and maintenance of 
capital stock, and by internal conflict, has increased the need for more 
long-term, sustained external finance, while reducing the capacity to absorb 
and utilize it effectively in the short run. 
The need to provide funds for operation and maintenance of basic 
infrastructure and services has grown to the point where this must take 
priority over new projects. Donor emphasis on project assistance has led to 
development of a large number of projects with insufficient regard to the 
ongoing cost of operating and maintaining them. The result is that all too 
many projects are operating well below capacity and are more a burden 
than a benefit to the economy. 
12 
Against this background, what basis have we for renewed hope in 
the long-term prospects of Africa? It seems clear that the basis for that 
hope must depend on what is done, or not done, in the next decade to 
effect a transition to sustained and sustainable economic growth. There is a 
high degree of consensus among African leaders as to the tasks they 
confront over the next ten years in accomplishing this -- expanding food 
production, increasing the quality and attractiveness of rural life, selective 
industrialization, creation of new employment opportunities, improvements 
in education, health and social services, the establishment of a positive 
synthesis between economic growth and environmental preservation, 
diversification of exports, and improvements in the infrastructures, 
institutions, and management capabilities provide the basic underpinnings 
for economic growth. 
Recent experience demonstrates that these goals, however difficult, 
can be achieved if the changes in policy and improvements in economic 
management undertaken by Africans are supported and reinforced by 
expanded levels of resource flows on a sustained and reliable basis. A 
report just released by the World Bank and the UNDP on "Africa's 
Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s" cites a number of current signs of a 
turnaround in Africa. GDP grew more than 2.3 percent a year on average 
in the years 1985 through 1987 and if adjustments are made to reflect the 
substantial devaluation in the currency of Nigeria to reduce its 
disproportionate weight in the statistics of the region, it would have shown 
a cumulative growth of GDP of some 13 percent, a dramatic difference 
from the stagnation reflected in the official statistics. 
Agricultural output over the 1985-1988 period tripled that of the 
average of the previous fifteen years, exceeding population growth for the 
first extended period since 1970. And the share of world exports of the 
major non-oil primary commodities of sub-Saharan Africa grew 30 percent 
during 1984-1986, reversing the decline that began in 1970. It is too early to 
assume that this encouraging performance means that the African 
economy has moved into a decisive uptrend. But it does show that Africa is 
on the move again. 
Much remains to be done. Africa is far from homogeneous and 
many countries are still lagging behind. About half of them have not yet 
adopted programs of policy reform and structural adjustment. And even 
those that have done so have yet to demonstrate that they can maintain 
their commitment to this difficult process and absorb the political and 
social pressures it produces. 
African countries must continue to improve their financial 
management and the efficiency of their public enterprises, reduce 
centralized control of their economies, and allow market mechanisms to 
function more effectively. They must move much further towards 
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establishing a long-term policy environment and the improved prices which 
provide incentives to increased agricultural production, particularly aimed 
at the small farmer. This should be accompanied by measures which 
provide small farmers with access to credit and to improved seeds and 
implements, as well as extension services through which the results of the 
latest research can be made available to them. They should significantly 
expand investment in rural infrastructure, roads, storage facilities, and in 
rural education, health and social services. The revitalization of the African 
economies rest primarily on the revitalization of agriculture. This, in turn, 
must be based primarily on recognition of and support for the central role 
of the small farmer. 
Special efforts should be made to expand the range and variety of 
food crops, as well as export crops, to increase food self-sufficiency and to 
effect a broader diversification of agricultural exports. There should be a 
concerted effort to develop small industries in the rural areas, particularly 
those which utilize local products and serve local markets. Training 
programs designed to provide the skilled workers for such industries should 
also be located in rural areas. Development and investment policies should 
be aimed specifically at spreading urban growth over a large number of 
smaller urban centers that interact closely with the local rural economy, 
rather than allowing growth to be concentrated in capitals and a few other 
already over-grown cities. In an era in which knowledge is more and more 
the prime factor in economic growth and comparative advantage, 
educational systems should be reoriented to providing the skills the 
economy requires, enabling the country to absorb and apply the latest and 
most appropriate technologies. 
Again, nowhere is this more important than it is in agriculture. 
Revolutionary developments in biogenetics and their application to plant 
and animal breeding promise to make technology the principal source of 
increased food production in the future. The African nations cannot afford 
to be left behind in this new green revolution, which poses new threats to 
the competitiveness of some of their traditional agricultural crops, while at 
the same time opening up to them opportunities for a new generation of 
comparative advantage. The international agricultural research institutes, 
supported by the Consultative Groups for International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR), have demonstrated the impressive results which can be 
achieved by the application of concerted research to tropical agriculture. 
But these institutions are not yet adequately linked to national agricultural 
research programs in Africa; nor are their results being made sufficiently 
available to the small peasant farmers who need them most. 
Agricultural research must also take into account the fact that 
African farmers themselves possess a vast reservoir of experience and 
knowledge accumulated over centuries of experience in dealing with the 
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special conditions of African agriculture. It is of vital importance that this 
knowledge and experience not be lost or downgraded in the course of 
developing and applying new technologies and techniques. Rather, what is 
needed is a synthesis of modern and traditional knowledge, and agricultural 
research programs in Africa should be designed specifically to achieve this. 
African nations, despite their economic constraints, must invest 
more in agricultural research and in making its results available to their 
own peasant farmers. In relative terms, agricultural research is less costly 
than many other forms of research and it offers the prospect of high 
returns under African conditions. In my view, there is no better investment 
that African countries could make in their own future. 
African nations must make a basic commitment to sustainable 
development, particularly in the field of agriculture. As the recent Report 
of the World Commission on Environment and Development makes clear, 
this is the only sound and viable pathway to a future in which Africa's 
resources can be developed so as to meet the needs and aspirations of its 
people. Ecological breakdown has been one of the principal causes of 
economic decline in much of Africa, and the creation of a positive 
synthesis between economic development and environmental preservation 
is more urgently necessary in Africa than anywhere. It is in Africa's 
interest to lead the way towards sustainable development; it is in all of our 
interests to help. 
Population policies also need much higher priority. Recognizing that 
family size is primarily a matter of personal values and priorities, there are 
nevertheless more and more Africans who have the basic motivation to 
reduce family size, but lack the means to do so. More resources must be 
provided to ensure the availability of these means to those who want them, 
as well as more and better education as to the economic and social 
advantages of family planning. Even those countries which can ultimately 
accommodate much larger population levels must reduce their rates of 
population growth to levels which enable them to effect a continuing 
improvement in the conditions and quality of life of their existing 
populations. 
In their response to the United Nations Program of Action for 
Economic Recovery and Development 1986-90, the African nations have 
already demonstrated, to an impressive degree, their will and their ability to 
move in these directions. The international community has also responded 
positively, though still not adequately. The lack of adequate external capital 
constitutes a grave and urgent threat to Africa's economic and social future. 
It is imperative that we support long-term recovery and development in 
Africa with the same kind of priority and generosity we provided at the 
time of the recent famine emergency. Otherwise, the stage is being set for 
future tragedies of even greater magnitude, tragedies that will lay heavily 
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on our consciences because they are avoidable. Yet, the additional 
investment required from us is both modest and viable whether measured 
in human, economic or security terms. 
The five year period of the U.N.'s African recovery and 
development program will end next year. I propose that it be replaced by a 
new Program of Long-Term Development covering the entire decade of the 
1990s. For the African governments, this would represent renewal and 
extension of the commitments they made under the current recovery and 
development program, modified by the experience and insights gained since 
then. For the donor community, the commitments would be even more 
specific, including as prime elements: 
1. A program of debt restructuring and reduction which would reduce 
over the entire decade the debt servicing charges of each African 
country to levels that would not use more than say 20 percent of their 
export earnings. 
2. Recasting of existing structural adjustment programs with the World 
Bank and the IMF to reduce the human suffering of the poorest 
sectors of the population and permit an increase in food supplies, 
health and nutritional services to the most needy, particularly children. 
3. The particulars of each country's recovery and development program 
to be presented to the donor community through the consultative 
groups of the World Bank, making explicit the commitments of the 
government to the internal policies and priorities required to meet the 
objectives of the program, as well as its needs for external support. 
4. The donor community to make commitments over the ten year period 
of the Program to provide, in appropriate form, the external funds 
required to carry out the program on a basis related to the 
performance of the country itself. 
5. The international community to undertake to provide special support 
for agricultural research and the dissemination and application of its 
results at the level of the peasant farmer. 
6. New measures to be developed to make more effective use of food aid 
as an important component of the external resources to be provided 
under the new Program. These measures would include commitments 
of food supplies during the period of the Program designed to make up 
food deficits and utilize food as capital for projects and programs set 
up to increase local food production and improve the quality of rural 
life. Much of the experience and capacity for this already exists in the 
U.N.'s World Food Program and the International Fund for 
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Agricultural Development as well as the development assistance 
programs of other donors. 
7. The international community to take special measures to resolve 
existing conflicts in Africa and to prevent or contain the eruption of 
new ones. In the current much more positive international 
environment, it surely should be possible for the international 
community, through the United Nations, to use its influence to effect a 
settlement of the major conflicts which continue to afflict Africa. And 
it should be possible, too, to provide a special system of permanent 
guarantees to the African nations against external threats to their 
security. While this would not necessarily lead to the resolution or 
prevention of internal conflicts, it would provide a strong incentive for 
the reduction of military expenditures and the diversion of these 
resources to internal development. 
8. The international community to be especially supportive, too, of 
programs designed to enable the African countries to make the 
transition to long-term, sustainable development. Here the experience 
of the more developed countries has little to teach the developing 
world, but developing countries will need special support in terms of 
education, research, training and experimentation to make this 
transition which is so vital to the future of their economies. 
9. Private, voluntary organizations which have played an increasingly 
important role in meeting Africa's humanitarian and development 
needs, should receive more support and be given a much stronger voice 
in the consultative processes by which coordination as between Africa 
and its development partners is effected. Foreign voluntary 
organizations should commit themselves to helping to develop, support 
and strengthen indigenous organizations through long-term 
partnerships with them rather than seeking to establish a permanent 
organizational presence of their own in the region. 
None of these measures individually represents a radical departure 
from the current thinking of either the African countries or the 
international community. They draw on insights and experience by 
Africans and their development partners over the past three decades of 
African development. A number of African governments have already 
made the kinds of changes in their policies and priorities that such a 
program demands. The programs of the World Bank, UNDP, the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development, the African 
Development Bank, and other governmental and non-governmental 
agencies have already moved in this direction. What would be new is the 
long-term nature of the Program and the commitment of the creditor and 
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donor communities to providing the debt relief and external funding 
required on a reliable, long-term basis. What would be new, too, is the 
degree of integration and coordination of these measures within the 
framework of a single agreed Program. 
The progress made to date in effecting the recovery of Africa from 
the disastrous consequences of the famine and economic decline provides 
the basis for a new era of hope for Africa. These hopes reside primarily in 
the impressive degree of will for change and capacity for change and for 
sacrifice demonstrated by the Africans themselves. Clearly, they must do a 
great deal more if they are to ensure the political, social and economic 
conditions required to maintain the momentum of development over time. 
They must be willing to face a long and hard road to the more promising 
future that is possible for them. But clearly, too, they cannot go it alone. 
They need a new and sustained commitment of support from the 
international community. They need us all to make the 1990s Africa's 
decade. What better way to start that decade than by a new U.N. 
Conference on Africa in which the Africans and their supporters in the 
international community join in forging a long-term partnership designed 
to translate our new hopes for Africa into realities? This is not only 
feasible, it is imperative. For Africa's future is intimately tied to the 
conditions shaping our future and to the prospects for making our global 
village a secure and promising home for the entire human family. 
